Situating emotional experience by Wilson-Mendenhall, Christine D. et al.
“fnhum-07-00764” — 2013/11/22 — 21:44 — page 1 — #1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 26 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00764
Situating emotional experience
Christine D.Wilson-Mendenhall 1*, Lisa Feldman Barrett 1† and LawrenceW. Barsalou2†
1 Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
2 Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Edited by:
Martin Klasen, Rheinisch-Westfälische
Technische Hochschule Aachen
University, Germany
Reviewed by:
Ruben Gur, University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine, USA
Cindy Hagan, University of
Cambridge, UK
*Correspondence:
Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall,
Department of Psychology,
Northeastern University, 125
Nightingale Hall, Boston, MA 02115,
USA
e-mail: cd.wilson@neu.edu
†Lisa Feldman Barrett and Lawrence
W. Barsalou have joint senior
authorship.
Psychological construction approaches to emotion suggest that emotional experience
is situated and dynamic. Fear, for example, is typically studied in a physical danger
context (e.g., threatening snake), but in the real world, it often occurs in social contexts,
especially those involving social evaluation (e.g., public speaking). Understanding situated
emotional experience is critical because adaptive responding is guided by situational
context (e.g., inferring the intention of another in a social evaluation situation vs. monitoring
the environment in a physical danger situation). In an fMRI study, we assessed situated
emotional experience using a newly developed paradigm in which participants vividly
imagine different scenarios from a ﬁrst-person perspective, in this case scenarios involving
either social evaluation or physical danger.We hypothesized that distributed neural patterns
would underlie immersion in social evaluation and physical danger situations, with shared
activity patterns across both situations in multiple sensory modalities and in circuitry
involved in integrating salient sensory information, andwith unique activity patterns for each
situation type in coordinated large-scale networks that reﬂect situated responding. More
speciﬁcally, we predicted that networks underlying the social inference and mentalizing
involved in responding to a social threat (in regions that make up the “default mode”
network) would be reliably more active during social evaluation situations. In contrast,
networks underlying the visuospatial attention and action planning involved in responding to
a physical threat would be reliably more active during physical danger situations.The results
supported these hypotheses. In line with emerging psychological construction approaches,
the ﬁndings suggest that coordinated brain networks offer a systematic way to interpret the
distributed patterns that underlie the diverse situational contexts characterizing emotional
life.
Keywords: emotion, situated cognition, affective neuroscience, affect, cognitive neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals is
often used to motivate emotion research that focuses on identi-
fying the biological signatures for ﬁve or so emotion categories
(Ekman, 2009; Hess and Thibault, 2009). Interestingly, though,
the evolution paradigm shift initiated by Darwin and other scien-
tists heavily emphasized variability: species are biopopulations in
which individuals within a population are unique and in which
individual variation within a species is meaningfully tied to varia-
tion in the environment (and they are not physical types deﬁned
by essential features; Barrett, 2013). In other words, an individ-
ual organism is best understood by the situational context in
which it operates. It is not a great leap, then, to hypothesize
that “situatedness” is also a basic principle by which the human
mind operates, during emotions and during many other mental
phenomena (Barrett, 2013).
Situated approaches to the mind typically view the brain as
a coordinated system designed to use information captured dur-
ing prior situations (and stored in memory) to ﬂexibly interpret
and infer what is happening in the current situation – dynam-
ically shaping moment-to-moment responding in the form of
perceiving, coordinating action, regulating the body, and orga-
nizing thoughts (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 2003, 2009; Aydede
and Robbins, 2009; Mesquita et al., 2010; Barrett, 2013). “Cog-
nitive” research domains (e.g., episodic and semantic memory,
visual object recognition, language comprehension) are increas-
ingly adopting a situated view of the mind (for empirical reviews,
see Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998; Barsalou, 2003; Bar, 2004; Yeh
and Barsalou, 2006; Mesquita et al., 2010). In contrast, emo-
tion research largely remains entrenched in a “stimulus-response”
reﬂexive approach to brain function, which typically views the
brain as reacting to the demands of the environment, often in
a simple, stereotyped way (cf. Raichle, 2010). Traditional “basic”
emotion views often assume that an event (i.e., a stimulus) triggers
one of several stereotyped responses in the brain and body that can
be classiﬁed as either fear, disgust, anger, sadness, happiness, etc.
(for a review of basic emotion models, see Tracy and Randles,
2011). Decades of research have revealed substantial variability
in the neural, physiological, and behavioral patterns associated
with these emotion categories (cf. Barrett, 2006; Lindquist et al.,
2012). Whereas basic emotion approaches now focus on try-
ing to identify primitive “core” (and often narrowly deﬁned)
instances of these emotions, alternative theoretical approaches
to emotion, such as psychological construction, propose tak-
ing a situated approach to explaining the variability that exists
in the experiences people refer to using words like fear, disgust,
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anger, sadness, happiness (and using many other emotion terms;
Barrett, 2009b, 2013).
In the psychological construction view that we have developed,
emotions are not fundamentally different from other kinds of
brain states (Barrett, 2009a, 2012;Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).
During emotional experiences and during other kinds of experi-
ences, the brain is using prior experience to dynamically interpret
ongoing neural activity, which guides an individual’s responding
in the situation. We refer to this process, which often occurs with-
out awareness (i.e., it is a fundamental process for making sense
of one’s relation to the world at any given moment), as situated
conceptualization. The term situated takes on a broad meaning
in our view, referring to the distributed neural activity across the
modal systems of the brain involved in constructing situations, not
just to perception of the external environment or to what might
be considered the background. More speciﬁcally, situated neural
activity reﬂects the dynamic actions that individuals engage in,
and the events, internal bodily sensations, and mentalizing that
they experience, as well as the perceptions of the external environ-
mental setting and the physical entities and individuals it contains
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).
Emotions, like other classes of mental experiences, operate
in this situation-speciﬁc way because rich, cross-modal knowl-
edge is critical for interpreting, inferring, and responding when
similar situations occur in the future. On this view, situational
knowledge develops for emotion categories like fear, anger, etc.,
as it does for other abstract categories of experiences (e.g., sit-
uations that involve the abstract categories gossip, modesty, or
ambition). Experiences categorized as fear, for example, can occur
when delivering a speech to a respected audience or when losing
control while driving a car. A situated, psychological construc-
tion perspective suggests that it is more adaptive to respond
differently in these situations, guided by knowledge of the situ-
ation, than to respond in a stereotyped way. Whereas responding
in the social speech situation involves inferring what audience
members are thinking, responding in the physical car situation
involves rapid action and attention to the environment. Stereo-
typed responding in the form of preparing the body to ﬂee or ﬁght
does not address the immediate threat present in either of these
situations. A psychological construction approach highlights the
importance of studying the situations commonly categorized as
emotions like fear or anger, not because these situations merely
describe emotions, but because emotions would not exist without
them.
A signiﬁcant challenge in taking a situated approach to study-
ing emotional experience is maintaining a balance between the
rich, multimodal nature of situated experiences and experimen-
tal control. Immersion in emotional situations through vividly
imagined imagery is recognized as a powerful emotion induction
method for evoking physiological responses (Lang et al., 1980;
Lench et al., 2011). Imagery paradigms were initially developed
to study situations thought to be central to various forms of psy-
chopathology (Lang, 1979; Pitman et al., 1987), and remain a focus
in clinical psychology (for a review, see Holmes and Mathews,
2010). In contrast, a small proportion of neuroimaging studies
investigating emotion in typical populations use these methods.
Figure 1 illustrates the methods used across 397 studies in a
FIGURE 1 | Methods used to study emotion and affect. Visual methods
typically involved viewing faces, pictures, ﬁlms, words, sentences, and/or
bodies. Auditory methods typically involved listening to voices, sounds,
music, words, and/or sentences. Imagery methods typically involved
generating imagery using personal memories, sentences, faces, and/or
pictures (and are described further in the main text). Recall methods
typically involved recalling personal events, words, ﬁlms, or pictures. Tactile
methods involved touch or thermal stimulation, olfaction methods involved
smelling odors, and taste methods involved tasting food. Multiple
modalities refers to studies that involved two or more of the
aforementioned methods in the same study, with visual and auditory
methods being the most frequent combination.
database constructed for neuroimaging meta-analyses of affect
and emotion (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012)1. Visual
methods dominate (70% of studies), with the majority of these
studies using faces (42% of visual methods) and pictures (36%
of visual methods) like the International Affective Picture Sys-
tem (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008). In contrast, only 6% of studies
have used imagery methods2. Imagery methods appear to be
used more frequently when studying complex socio-emotional
experiences that would be difﬁcult to induce with an unfamiliar
face or picture and that are often clinically oriented, including
angry rumination (Denson et al., 2009), personal anxiety (Bystrit-
sky et al., 2001), competition and aggression (Rauch et al., 1999;
Pietrini et al., 2000), social rejection and insult (Kim et al., 2008;
Kross et al., 2011), romantic love (Aron et al., 2005), moral dis-
gust (Moll et al., 2005; Schaich Borg et al., 2008), and empathy
(Perry et al., 2012).
Imagery-based neuroimaging studies of emotional experience
typically take one of two approaches. The most frequent approach
is to draw on the personal experiences of the participant, cueing
speciﬁc, vivid memories in the scanner. Often participants’ per-
sonal narratives are scripted and vividly imagined (guided by the
experimenter) outside the scanner, and then a version of this script
1This meta-analytic database has recently been updated to include articles through
2011. The proportions reported here reﬂect the updated database.
2Lindquist et al. (2012) distinguished between “emotion perception” (deﬁned as
perception of emotion in others) and “emotion experience” (deﬁned as experience
of emotion in oneself) in their meta-analysis.When restricting our analysis of study
methods to studies that involved emotion experience (as coded in the database),
the use of imagery methods was still minimal (10% of 233 studies). Although
emotional imagery is typically thought of as an induction of emotion experience, it
seems likely that imagined situations, especially if they are social in nature, involve
dynamic emotion perception as well.
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is used to induce these memory-based emotional experiences dur-
ing neuroimaging (e.g., Bystritsky et al., 2001; Marci et al., 2007;
Gillihan et al., 2010). Less often, a speciﬁc visual stimulus is potent
enough to easily evoke personal, emotional imagery in the scan-
ner (e.g., face of a romantic partner; Aron et al., 2005; Kross et al.,
2011). The second approach is to present standard prompts (e.g.,
a sentence) that participants use to generate imagery underly-
ing emotional experiences (e.g., Colibazzi et al., 2010; Costa et al.,
2010). A key strength of the ﬁrst approach is that emotional expe-
riences are tightly tied to situated, real-life memories, whereas a
key strength of the second approach is the experimental control
afforded by presenting the same prompts to all participants. In
both cases, though, the situational context of the emotional expe-
riences is typically lost, either because the situational details are
speciﬁc to the individual (and thus lost in group-level analyses)
or because standard prompts are not designed to cultivate and/or
systematically manipulate the situational context of the emotional
experience.
Building on the strengths of existing imagery-based
approaches, we developed a neuroimaging procedure that would
allow us to examine participants’ immersion in rich, situated
emotional experiences while maximizing experimental control
and rigor. In our paradigm, participants ﬁrst received training
outside the scanner on how to immerse themselves in richly
detailed, full paragraph-long versions of emotional scenarios from
a ﬁrst-person perspective. The scenarios reﬂected two ecologi-
cally important situation types in which emotional experiences
are often grounded: social evaluation and physical danger. Every
scenario was constructed using written templates to induce a
social evaluation emotional experience or a physical danger emo-
tional experience (see Table 1 for examples). Participants listened
to audio recordings of the scenarios, which facilitated immer-
sion by allowing participants to close their eyes. In the scanner,
participants were prompted with shorter, core (audio) versions
of the scenarios in the scanner, so that a statistically powerful
neuroimaging design could be implemented.
We hypothesized that immersion across both social evaluation
and physical danger situations would be characterized by dis-
tributed neural patterns across multiple sensory modalities and
across regions involved in detecting and integrating salient sensory
information. Much previous research has demonstrated neural
overlap between sensorimotor perception/action and sensorimo-
tor imagery (for a review, see Kosslyn et al., 2001). If our scenario
immersionmethod induces richly situated emotional experiences,
then the vivid mental imagery generated should be grounded in
brain regions underlying sensory perception and action. Perhaps
Table 1 | Examples of physical danger and social evaluation scenarios used in the experiment.
Examples of physical danger situations
Full version
(P1) You are driving home after staying out drinking all night. (S1) The long stretch of road in front of you seems to go on forever. (P2A) You close your
eyes for a moment. (P2C) The car begins to skid. (S2) You jerk awake. (S3) You feel the steering wheel slip in your hands.
Core version
(P1) You are driving home after staying out drinking all night. (P2) You close your eyes for a moment, and the car begins to skid.
Full version
(P1) You are jogging along an isolated lake at dusk. (S1) Thick dark woods surround you as you move along the main well-marked trail. (P2A) On a whim,
you veer onto an overgrown unmarked trail. (P2C) You become lost in the dark. (S2) The trees close in around you, and you cannot see the sky. (S3) You
feel your pace quicken as you try to run out of the darkness.
Core version
(P1) You are jogging along an isolated lake at dusk. (P2) On a whim, you veer onto an overgrown unmarked trail, and become lost in the dark.
Examples of social evaluation situations
Full version
(P1) You are at a dinner party with friends. (S1) A debate about a contentious issue arises that gets everyone at the table talking. (P2A) You alone bravely
defend the unpopular view. (P2C)Your comments are met with sudden uncomfortable silence. (S2)Your friends are looking down at their plates, avoiding
eye contact with you. (S3) You feel your chest tighten.
Core version
(P1) You are at a dinner party with friends. (P2) You alone bravely defend the unpopular view, and your comments are met with sudden uncomfortable
silence.
Full version
(P1) You are having drinks at a trendy bar. (S1) The bartender tosses ice cubes into glasses, making a loud clinking sound. (P2A) An attractive stranger
strolls by, looks you up and down. (P2C) The stranger walks away smirking. (S2) People around you begin saying that you never meet the right people in
bars. (S3) Your cheeks are burning.
Core version
(P1) You are having drinks at a trendy bar. (P2) An attractive stranger strolls by, looks you up and down, and walks away smirking.
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surprisingly, studies using imagery paradigms to investigate emo-
tional experiences do not typically examine sensorimotor activity,
because the goal is often to isolate a category of experience (e.g.,
anger, disgust) or other “emotion” components. In contrast, our
approach is designed to examine the distributed neural patterns
that underlie emotional experiences.
Our second, primary hypothesis was motivated by a situ-
ated approach to studying the varieties of emotional experience.
We hypothesized that unique activity patterns for each situa-
tion type would occur in coordinated large-scale networks that
reﬂect situated responding. Whereas networks underlying the
social inference andmentalizing involved in responding to a social
threat (in regions thatmake up the“defaultmode”network)would
be reliably more active during social evaluation situations (for
reviews of default mode network functions, see Buckner et al.,
2008; Barrett and Satpute, 2013)3, networks underlying the visu-
ospatial attention and action planning involved in responding to
a physical threat would be reliably more active during physical
danger situations (for reviews of attention networks, see Chun
et al., 2011; Petersen and Posner, 2012; Posner, 2012). These
large-scale, distributed networks largely consist of heteromodal
regions that engage in the multimodal integration necessary for
coordinated interpretation and responding (Sepulcre et al., 2012;
Spreng et al., 2013).
As a further test of our secondhypothesis,we examinedwhether
participants’ trial-by-trial ratings of immersion during the train-
ing session correlated with neural activity, across social evaluation
scenarios and across physical danger scenarios. If emotional expe-
rience is situated, then feeling immersed in a situation should be
realized by neural circuitry that underlies engaging in the spe-
ciﬁc situation. Whereas immersion in social evaluation situations
should occur when affect is grounded inmentalizing about others,
immersion in physical danger situations should occur when affect
is grounded in taking action in the environment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty right-handed, native-English speakers from the Emory
community, ranging in age from 20 to 33 (10 female), participated
in the experiment. Six additional participants were dropped due to
problems with audio equipment (three participants) or excessive
head motion in the scanner. Participants had no history of psy-
chiatric illness and were not currently taking any psychotropic
medication. They received $100 in compensation, along with
anatomical images of their brain.
MATERIALS
A full and core form of each scenario was constructed, the latter
being a subset of the former (see Table 1). The full form served to
3There is substantial evidence that default mode network (DMN) regions are active
during tasks that involve social inference and mentalizing (for reviews, see Barrett
and Satpute, 2013; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009)
and that the DMN is disrupted in disorders involving social deﬁcits (for reviews, see
Menon, 2011;Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012). Recent work has directly demon-
strated that neural activity during social/mentalizing tasks occurs in theDMNas it is
deﬁned using resting state analyses (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) and that rest-
ing state connectivity in theDMNpredicts individual differences in social processing
(e.g., Yang et al., 2012).
provide a rich, detailed, and affectively compelling scenario. The
core form served to minimize presentation time in the scanner,
so that the number of necessary trials could be completed in the
time available. Each full and core scenario described an emotional
situation from a ﬁrst-person perspective, such that the participant
could immerse him- or herself in it. As described shortly, partic-
ipants practiced enriching the core form of the scenario during
the training sessions using details from the full form, so that they
would be prepared to immerse in the rich situational detail of the
full forms during the scanning session when they received the core
forms.
Both situation typeswere designed so the threat described could
be experienced as any number of high arousal, negative emotions
like fear or anger (and participants’ ratings of the ease of experi-
encing negative emotions in the two situation types validated this
approach; seeWilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011 for details). In social
evaluation situations, another person put the immersed partici-
pant in a socially threatening situation that involved damage to
his or her social reputation/ego. In physical danger situations,
the immersed participant put him- or herself in a physically
threatening situation that involved impending or actual bodily
harm.
Templates were used to systematically construct different sce-
narios in each situation type (social evaluation and physical
danger). Table 1 provides examples of the social evaluation and
physical danger scenarios. Each template for the full scenarios
speciﬁed a sequence of six sentences: three primary sentences (Pi)
also used in the related core scenario, and three secondary sen-
tences (Si) not used in the core scenario that provided additional
relevant detail. The two sentences in each core scenario were cre-
ated using P1 as the ﬁrst sentence and a conjunction of P2A and
P2C as the second sentence.
For the social evaluation scenarios, the template speciﬁed the
following six sentences in order: P1 described a setting and activity
performed by the immersed participant in the setting, along with
relevant personal attributes; S1 provided auditory detail about
the setting; P2A described an action (A) of the immersed par-
ticipant; P2C described the consequence (C) of that action; S2
described another person’s action in response to the consequence;
S3 described the participant’s resulting internal bodily experi-
ence. The templates for the physical danger scenarios were similar,
except that S1 provided visual detail about the setting (instead of
auditory), S2 described the participant’s action in response to the
consequence (instead of another person’s action), and S3 described
the participant’s resulting external somatosensory experience (on
the body surface).
A broad range of real-world situations served as the content of
the experimental situations. The physical danger scenarios were
drawn from situations that involved vehicles, pedestrians, water,
eating, wildlife, ﬁre, power tools, and theft. The social evaluation
scenarios were drawn from situations that involved friends, family,
neighbors, love, work, classes, public events, and service.
During the training sessions and the critical scan session,
30 social evaluation scenarios and 30 physical danger scenarios
were presented. An additional three scenarios of each type were
included in the training sessions so participants could practice the
scanner task prior to the scan session.
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IMAGING DESIGN
The event-related neuroimaging design involved two critical
events: (1) immersing in an emotional scenario (either a social
evaluation or physical danger scenario) and (2) experiencing the
immersed state in one of four ways upon hearing an auditory
categorization cue (as emotional: fearful or angry, or as another
active state: planning or observing). We will refer to the ﬁrst
event as “immersion” and the second event as “categorization.”
Because all neural patterns described here reﬂect activity during
the ﬁrst immersion event, we focus on this element of the design
(for the categorization results and related methodological details,
please seeWilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). This design afforded a
unique opportunity to examine the situations in which emotions
emerge before the emotional state was explicitly categorized. As
will be described later, the participant could not predict which
categorization cue would follow the scenario, so the immersion
period reﬂects situated activity that is not tied to a speciﬁc emotion
category.
In order to separate neural activity during the immersion events
from neural activity during the categorization events, we imple-
mented a catch trial design (Ollinger et al., 2001a,b). Participants
received 240 complete trials that each contained a social evalua-
tion scenario or a physical danger scenario followed immediately
by one of the four categorization cues. Participants also received
120 partial “catch” trials containing only a scenario (with no sub-
sequent categorization cue), which enabled separation of the ﬁrst
scenario immersion event from the second categorization event.
The partial trials constituted 33% of the total trials, a proportion
in the recommended range for an effective catch trial design. Each
of the 30 social evaluation scenarios and the 30 physical danger
scenarios was followed once by each categorization cue, for a total
of 240 complete trials (60 scenarios followed by 4 categorizations).
Each of the 60 scenarios also occurred twice as a partial trial, for a
total of 120 catch trials.
During each of 10 fMRI runs, participants received 24 complete
trials and 12 partial trials. The complete and partial trials were
intermixed with no-sound baseline periods that ranged from 0 to
12 s in increments of 3 s (average 4.5 s) in a pseudo-random order
optimized by optseq2 (Greve, 2002). On a given trial, participants
could not predict whether a complete or partial trial was coming,
a necessary condition for an effective catch trial design (Ollinger
et al., 2001a,b). Participants also could not predict the type of
situation or the categorization cue they would hear. Across trials
in a run, social evaluation and physical danger situations each
occurred 18 times, and each of the 4 categorization cues (anger,
fear, observe, plan) occurred 6 times, equally often with social
evaluation and physical danger scenarios. A given scenario was
never repeated within a run.
PROCEDURE
The experiment contained two training sessions and an fMRI scan
session. The ﬁrst training session occurred 24–48 h before the sec-
ond training session, followed immediately by the scan. During the
training sessions, participants were encouraged to immerse them-
selves in all scenarios from a ﬁrst-person perspective, to imagine
the scenario in as much vivid detail as possible, and to construct
mental imagery as if the scenario events were actually happening
to them. The relation of the full to the core scenarios was also
described, and participants were encouraged to reinstate the full
scenario whenever they heard a core scenario.
During theﬁrst training session, participants listenedover com-
puter headphones to the full versions of the 66 scenarios that
they would later receive on the practice trials and in the critical
scan 24–48 h later, with the social evaluation and physical danger
scenarios randomly intermixed. After hearing each full scenario,
participants provided three judgments about familiarity and prior
experiences, prompted by questions and response scales on the
screen. After taking a break, participants listened to the 66 core
versions of the scenarios, again over computer headphones and
randomly intermixed. While listening to each core scenario, par-
ticipants were instructed to reinstate the full version that they
listened to earlier, immersing themselves fully into the respective
scenario as it became enriched and developed frommemory. After
hearing each core scenario over the headphones, participants rated
the vividness of the imagery that they experiencedwhile immersed
in the scenario. This task encouraged the participants to develop
rich imagery upon hearing the core version. A detailed account of
the ﬁrst training session can be found inWilson-Mendenhall et al.
(2011).
During the second training session directly before the scan,
participants ﬁrst listened to the 66 full scenarios to be used in the
practice and critical scans, and rated how much they were able to
immerse themselves in each scenario, again hearing the scenarios
over computer headphones and in a random order. After listening
to each full scenario, the computer script presented the question,
“Howmuch did you experience ‘being there’ in the situation?”Par-
ticipants responded on the computer keyboard, using a 1–7 scale,
where one meant not experiencing being there in the situation at
all, four meant experiencing being there a moderate amount, and
seven meant experiencing being there very much, as if it was actu-
ally happening to them. The full scenarios were presented again
at this point to ensure that participants were reacquainted with
all the details before hearing the core versions later in the scan-
ner. This ﬁrst phase of the second training session lasted about an
hour.
Participants were then instructed on the task that they would
perform in the scanner andperformed a runof practice trials. Dur-
ing the practice and during the scans, audio events were presented
and responses collected using E-prime software (Schneider et al.,
2002). On each complete trial, participants were told to immerse
in the core version of a scenario as they listened to it, and that
they would receive one of four words (anger, fear, observe, plan)
afterward. The participant’s task was to judge how easy it was to
experience what the word described in the context of the situa-
tion. The core scenario was presented auditorily at the onset of a
9 s period, lasting no more than 8 s. The word was then presented
auditorily at the onset of a 3 s period, and participants responded
as soon as ready. To make their judgments, participants pressed
one of three buttons on a button box for not easy, somewhat
easy, and very easy. During the practice trials, participants used
an E-Prime button box to practice making responses. In the scan-
ner, participants used a Current Designs ﬁber optic button box
designed for high magnetic ﬁeld environments. Participants were
also told that there would be partial trials containing scenarios
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and no word cues, and that they were not to respond on these
trials.
At the beginning of the practice trials, participants heard the
same short instruction that theywould hear before every run in the
scanner: “Please close your eyes. Listen to each scenario and expe-
rience being there vividly. If a word follows, rate how easy it was
to have that experience in the situation.” Participants performed a
practice run equal in length to the runs that they would perform
in the scanner. Following the practice run, the experimenter and
the participant walked 5 min across campus to the scanner. Once
settled safely and comfortably in the scanner, an initial anatomical
scan was performed, followed by the 10 critical functional runs,
andﬁnally a second anatomical scan. Prior to beginning each func-
tional run, participants heard the same short instruction from the
practice run over noise-mufﬂing headphones. Participants took a
short break between each of the 8 min 3 s runs. Total time in the
scanner was a little over 1.5 h.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
The neuroimaging data were collected in the Biomedical Imaging
Technology Center at Emory University on a research-dedicated
3TSiemensTrio scanner. In each functional run, 163T2∗-weighted
echo planar image volumes depicting BOLD contrast were col-
lected using a Siemens 12-channel head coil and parallel imaging
with an iPAT acceleration factor of 2. Each volume was col-
lected using a scan sequence that had the following parameters:
56 contiguous 2 mm slices in the axial plane, interleaved slice
acquisition, TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, ﬂip angle = 90◦,
bandwidth = 2442 Hz/Px, FOV = 220 mm, matrix = 64,
voxel size = 3.44 mm × 3.44 mm × 2 mm. This scanning
sequence was selected after testing a variety of sequences for sus-
ceptibility artifacts in orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and the
temporal poles. We selected this sequence not only because it
minimized susceptibility artifacts by using thin slices and par-
allel imaging, but also because using 3.44 mm in the X–Y
dimensions yielded a voxel volume large enough to produce a
satisfactory temporal signal-to-noise ratio. In each of the two
anatomical runs, 176 T1-weighted volumes were collected using
a high resolution MPRAGE scan sequence that had the following
parameters: 192 contiguous slices in the sagittal plane, single-
shot acquisition, TR = 2300 ms, TE = 4 ms, ﬂip angle = 8◦,
FOV = 256 mm, matrix = 256, bandwidth = 130 Hz/Px, voxel
size = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm.
IMAGE PREPROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
Image preprocessing and statistical analysis were conducted in
AFNI (Cox, 1996). The ﬁrst anatomical scan was registered to
the second, and the average of the two scans computed to cre-
ate a single high-quality anatomical scan. Initial preprocessing
of the functional data included slice time correction and motion
correction in which all volumes were registered spatially to a vol-
ume within the last functional run. A volume in the last run was
selected as the registration base because it was collected closest in
time to the second anatomical scan, which facilitated later align-
ment of the functional and anatomical data. The functional data
were then smoothed using an isotropic 6 mm full-width half-
maximumGaussian kernel. Voxels outside the brainwere removed
from further analysis at this point, as were high-variability low-
intensity voxels likely to be shifting in and out of the brain due to
minor head motion. Finally, the signal intensities in each volume
were divided by the mean signal value for the respective run and
multiplied by 100 to produce percent signal change from the run
mean. All later analyses were performed on these percent signal
change data.
The averaged anatomical scan was corrected for non-
uniformity in image intensity, skull-stripped, and then aligned
with the functional data. The resulting aligned anatomical dataset
was warped to Talairach space using an automated procedure
employing the TT_N27 template (also known as the Colin brain,
an averaged dataset from one person scanned 27 times).
Regression analyses were performed on each individual’s pre-
processed functional data using a canonical, ﬁxed-shape Gamma
function to model the hemodynamic response. In the ﬁrst regres-
sion analysis, betas were estimated using the event onsets for
10 conditions: 2 situation immersion conditions (social, physi-
cal) and 8 categorization conditions that resulted from crossing
the situation with the categorization cue (social-anger, physical-
anger, social-fear, physical-fear, social-observe, physical-observe,
social-plan, physical-plan). Again, we only present results for the
two situation immersion conditions here (seeWilson-Mendenhall
et al., 2011 for the categorization results). The two situation
immersion conditions were modeled by creating regressors that
included scenario immersion events from both the complete tri-
als and the partial trials. Including scenario immersion events
from both trial types in one regressor made it possible to mathe-
matically separate the situation immersion conditions from the
subsequent categorization conditions (Ollinger et al., 2001a,b).
Because scenario immersion events were 9 s in duration, the
Gamma function was convolved with a boxcar function for
the entire duration to model the situation immersion condi-
tions. Six regressors obtained from volume registration during
preprocessing were also included to remove any residual sig-
nal changes correlated with movement (translation in the X, Y,
and Z planes; rotation around the X, Y, and Z axes). Scan-
ner drift was removed by ﬁnding the best-ﬁtting polynomial
function correlated with time in the preprocessed time course
data.
At the group level, the betas resulting from the each individual’s
regression analysis were then entered into a second-level, random-
effects ANOVA. Two key analyses were computed at this level of
analysis using a voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005 in conjunction
with the 41-voxel extent threshold determined by AFNI ClustSim
to produce an overall corrected threshold of p < 0.05. In the ﬁrst
analysis (that assessed our ﬁrst hypothesis), we extracted clusters
that were more active during immersion in social evaluation situ-
ations than in the no-sound baseline and clusters that were more
active during immersion in physical danger situations than in the
no-sound baseline (using the voxel-wise and extent thresholds
speciﬁed above). We then entered the results of these two con-
trasts (social evaluation > baseline; physical danger > baseline)
into a conjunction analysis to determine clusters shared by the two
situation types (i.e., overlapping regions of activity). In the sec-
ond analysis (that assessed our second hypothesis), we computed
a standard contrast to directly compare immersion during social
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evaluation situations to immersion during physical danger situa-
tions using t tests (social evaluation > physical danger; physical
danger> social evaluation).
A second individual-level regression was computed to examine
the relationship between neural activity and the scenario immer-
sion ratings collected during the training session just prior to the
scan session, providing an additional test of our secondhypothesis.
This regressionmodel paralleled theﬁrst regressionmodelwith the
following exceptions. In this regression analysis, each participant’s
“being there” ratings were speciﬁed trial-by-trial for each scenario
in the social evaluation immersion condition and in the physi-
cal danger immersion condition. For the two situation immersion
conditions (social evaluation and physical danger), both the onset
times and ratings were then entered into the regression using the
amplitude modulation option in AFNI. This option speciﬁed two
regressors for each situation immersion condition, which were
used to detect: (1) voxels in which activity was correlated with the
ratings (also known as a parametric regressor); (2) voxels in which
activity was constant for the condition andwas not correlated with
the ratings.
At the group level, each participant’s betas produced from the
ﬁrst parametric regressor for each situation immersion condition
(i.e., indicating the strength of the correlation between neural
activity and “being there” immersion ratings) were next entered
into a second-level analysis. In this analysis, the critical statis-
tic for each condition was a t test indicating if the mean across
individuals differed signiﬁcantly from zero (zero indicating no
correlation between neural activity and the ratings). In these anal-
yses, a slightly smaller cluster size of 15 contiguous voxels was used
in conjunction with the voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005.
In summary, this analysis is examining whether scenarios rated
as easier to immerse in during the training are associated with
greater neural activity in any region of the brain (the individual-
level analysis), and whether this relationship between immersion
ratings and neural activity is consistent across participants (group-
level analysis). We computed this analysis separately for social
evaluation and for physical danger situation types to test our
hypothesis. This analysis is not examining between-subject indi-
vidual differences in immersion (i.e., whether participants who
generally experience greater immersion across all scenarios also
showgreater neural activity in speciﬁc regions),which is a different
question that is not of interest here.
RESULTS
COMMON NEURAL ACTIVITY DURING IMMERSION ACROSS
SITUATIONS
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that neural activity during both situations
would be reliably greater than baseline across multiple sensory
modalities and across regions involved in detecting and integrating
salient sensory information (seeTable 2 for the baseline contrasts).
As shown in Figure 2A, neural activity was reliably greater than
baseline in bilateral primary somatomotor and visual cortex, as
well as premotor cortex, SMA, and extrastriate visual cortex, sug-
gesting that participants easily immersed in the situations. The
self-reported rating data from the training session conﬁrmed that
participants found the social evaluation and physical danger sit-
uations relatively easy to immerse in (see Figure 2B), with no
signiﬁcant differences in “being there” ratings between situation
types [repeated measures t test; t(19) = 1.64, p > 0.05]. Because
participants listened to the scenarios with their eyes closed and
because participants did not make responses while immersing in
the scenarios, it is signiﬁcant that these sensorimotor regions were
signiﬁcantly more active than the no-sound baseline. As would
be expected with an auditory, language-based immersion pro-
cedure, we observed activity in bilateral auditory cortex and in
superior temporal and inferior frontal regions associated with lan-
guage processing, with more extensive activity in the left frontal
regions.
Consistent with the hypothesis that immersion would also
generally involve selection, encoding, and integration of salient
sensory and other information, we observed activity in bilateral
hippocampus and in right amygdala (see Figure 2C). Extensive
evidence implicates the hippocampus in mnemonic functions
(Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Tulving, 2002; Squire, 2004),
especially the integration and binding of the multimodal infor-
mation involved in constructing (and reconstructing) situated
memories (Addis and McAndrews, 2006; Kroes and Fernandez,
2012). More recent evidence establishes a central role for this
structure in simulating future, imagined situations (Addis et al.,
2007; Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007, 2012), which is
similar in nature to our immersion paradigm, and which requires
similar integration and binding of concepts established in mem-
ory (from prior experience). The amygdala plays a central role
in emotional experiences by efﬁciently integrating multisensory
information to direct attention and guide encoding (Costafreda
et al., 2008; Bliss-Moreau et al., 2011; Klasen et al., 2012; Lindquist
et al., 2012), especially during situations that involve threat
(Adolphs, 2008; Miskovic and Schmidt, 2012). As we will see,
no differences emerged in the amygdala or in the hippocam-
pus during the social evaluation and physical danger situations,
suggesting these structures played a similar role in both types of
experiences.
UNIQUE NEURAL PATTERNS EMERGE FOR SOCIAL EVALUATION AND
PHYSICAL DANGER SITUATIONS
Our second hypothesis was that networks underlying the social
inference and mentalizing involved in responding to a social
threat would be reliably more active during social evaluation
situations, whereas networks underlying visuospatial attention
and action planning involved in responding to a physical threat
would be reliably more active during physical danger situa-
tions. As Table 3, together with Figures 3–5, illustrate, the
neural patterns that emerged when we compared social evalua-
tion situations to physical danger situations are consistent with
these predictions. Figure 3 shows these results on represen-
tative 2D slices, with regions showing reliably greater activity
during social evaluation in orange, and regions showing reli-
ably greater activity during physical danger in green. Figures 4
and 5 display these maps projected onto the surface of the
brain4, and directly compare the maps from this study with
4It is important to note that each individual’s data were not analyzed on the surface.
We are using a standardized (Talairach) surface space for illustration of the group
results in comparison to the resting state network maps from a large sample that
have been made freely available (Yeo et al., 2011).
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Table 2 | Social evaluation > baseline and physical danger > baseline contrasts.
Cluster Brain region Brodmann area(s) Mean t Spatial extent Peak
x y z
Social evaluation > baseline
1 R temp pole/STG/STS 38, 21, 22, 41, 42 4.73 1868 46 −16 −7
R angular g 39
R ITG/fusiform g 37, 19
R mid/sup occipital g 19
2 L temp pole/STG/STS 38, 21, 22, 41, 42 4.83 1780 −45 9 −15
L angular g 39
L mid/sup occipital g 19
3 L and R calarine/lingual g 17, 18, 19 4.21 1532 14 −57 14
L and R posterior cingulate 31
L and R parahippocampal g 35, 36
L and R hippocampus/amygdala
4 L premotor/precentral g 6, 4 4.36 921 −37 −6 50
L postcentral g 2, 3
L lateral PFC/Ant insula 44, 45, 46, 9
5 L and R SMA/precentral g 6, 4 4.60 596 −4 7 48
6 R premotor/precentral g 6, 4 4.52 501 50 −11 51
R postcentral g 2, 3
7 mPFC/mOFC 10, 11 4.45 115 −1 34 −8
8 R lateral PFC 45/46 4.09 77 52 19 22
9 L fusiform g 37 4.00 58 −36 −38 −11
Phyiscal danger > baseline
1 L and R SMA/premotor 6 4.37 6887 −5 7 47
L and R precentral g 4
L and R postcentral g 2, 3
L and R mid cingulate 24, 31
L lateral PFC/Ant insula 44, 45, 46, 9
L and R temp Pole/STG/STS 38, 21, 22, 41, 42
L and R MTG 37
L ITG/fusiform 37
L and R parahippocampal g 35, 36
L and R hippocampus/amygdala
L and R mid/sup occipital g 19
L and R calcarine/lingual g 17, 18, 19
L inferior parietal 40, 7
2 L and R thalamus 4.22 85 −9 −21 2
3 R lateral PFC 45/46 3.93 68 55 19 26
Spatial extent is the number of 23.67 mm3 functional voxels. L is left and R is right, Ant is anterior, Mid is middle, Sup is superior, m is medial, and g is gyrus. PFC
is prefrontal cortex and OFC is orbitofrontal cortex. STG is superior temporal gyrus, STS superior temporal sulcus, MTG is middle temporal gyrus, and ITG is inferior
temporal gyrus. SMA is supplementary motor area.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) shared neural activity during social evaluation and physical
danger situations in sensorimotor cortex (revealed by the conjunction analysis
in which each situation was compared to the “no sound” baseline) (B) self-
reported immersion ratings from the training session (error bars depict SEM
across participant condition means) (C) shared neural activity revealed by the
conjunction analysis in the amygdala and hippocampus.
the large-scale networks that have been deﬁned using resting
state connectivity techniques across large samples (Yeo et al.,
2011).
Heightened activity in the default mode network during social
evaluation
As displayed in Figure 3 and Table 3, robust activity was observed
during immersion in social evaluation situations (vs. physical
danger situations) in midline medial prefrontal and posterior cin-
gulate regions, as well as lateral temporal regions, in which activity
spanned from the temporal pole to the posterior superior tem-
poral sulcus/temporoparietal junction bilaterally, and on the left,
extended in to inferior frontal gyrus. This pattern of activity maps
onto a network that is often referred to as the “default mode” net-
work (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner
et al., 2008). Figure 4 illustrates the overlap between the default
mode network and the pattern of neural activity that underlies
immersing in social evaluation situations here (Yeo et al., 2011).
The default mode network has been implicated inmentalizing and
social inference (i.e., inferring what others’ are thinking/feeling
and how they will act), as well as other socially motivated tasks,
including autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the
future, and moral reasoning (for reviews, see Buckner et al., 2008;
VanOverwalle andBaetens, 2009; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). Con-
sistent with the idea of situated emotional experience, participants
engaged in the social inference and mentalizing that would be
adaptive in responding to a social threat when immersed in social
evaluation situations.
Heightened activity in fronto-parietal attention networks during
physical danger
Figure 3 and Table 3 show the fronto-parietal patterns of activ-
ity observed during immersion in physical danger situations (vs.
social evaluation situations). In addition to lateral frontal and
parietal regions (including bilateral middle frontal gyrus, bilat-
eral inferior frontal gyrus extending into pars orbitalis, bilateral
inferior parietal lobule, and bilateral superior parietal/precuneus),
neural activity was also reliably greater in right anterior insula,mid
cingulate cortex, and bilateral premotor cortex during immer-
sion in physical danger situations. Figure 5 illustrates the overlap
between this pattern of activity and three networks that have
been implicated in attention5 (Chun et al., 2011; Petersen and
5 These networks are sometimes referred to by different names, and can take some-
what different forms depending on the methods used to deﬁne them (with core
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Table 3 | Brain regions that emerged in the social evaluation vs. physical danger contrast.
Cluster Brain region Brodmann area(s) Mean t Spatial extent Peak
x y z
Social evaluation > physical danger
1 L STG/STS/post insula/angular g/temp pole/OFC/IFG 41, 42, 22, 21, 39, 38, 47, 45 5.13 2059 −58 −17 −1
2 R STG/STS/post insula/temp pole 41, 42, 22, 21, 38 4.77 1668 51 9 −20
3 mPFC/mOFC/SMA 10, 11, 9, 8, 6 4.63 1136 4 51 31
4 Post cingulate/precuneus 31, 7 4.73 498 −7 −53 34
5 R STG/STS/angular g 22, 39 3.97 112 40 −49 22
6 L cuneus 18 3.67 57 −7 −95 23
Physical danger > social evaluation
1 L inf/sup parietal/precuneus 40, 7 4.23 992 −59 −33 38
2 Mid cing/L premotor/L MFG 24, 6 4.20 715 4 6 31
3 L MTG/fusiform g/parahippocampal g 37, 20, 35 4.37 478 −49 −54 0
4 Mid cing 31, 23 4.35 321 −13 −26 37
5 L MFG 46, 9, 10 4.14 266 −37 38 16
6 R MFG/Ant insula/OFC 10 3.99 212 37 44 6
7 R inf parietal 40 4.14 199 59 −37 35
8 R premotor 6 4.16 173 15 2 59
9 R MFG 9 3.95 104 31 30 38
10 R precuneus 7 3.94 74 7 −56 53
11 L OFC 11 3.82 49 −29 44 −5
12 R restrosplenial 29 3.78 42 12 −44 12
Spatial extent is the number of 23.67 mm3 functional voxels. L is left and R is right. Post is posterior, Ant is anterior, Inf is inferior, Sup is superior, m is medial, and
g is gyrus. PFC is prefrontal cortex, OFC is orbitofrontal cortex, Cing is cingulate, and MFG is middle frontal gyrus. STG is superior temporal gyrus, STS is superior
temporal sulcus, and MTG is middle temporal gyrus. SMA is supplementary motor area.
FIGURE 3 | Social evaluation vs. physical danger contrast, with regions reliably more active during social evaluation in orange and regions reliably
more active during physical danger in green.
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FIGURE 4 | Comparison of the social evaluation map from this study with the default mode network defined byYeo et al. (2011).
Posner, 2012; Posner, 2012). The most signiﬁcant overlap was
observed in the lateral fronto-parietal executive network and the
dorsal attention network. These networks are thought to allocate
attentional resources to prioritize speciﬁc sensory inputs (what is
often referred to as“orienting”to the external environment) and to
guide ﬂexible shifts in behavior (Dosenbach et al., 2007; Petersen
and Posner, 2012). The operations they carry out are critical for
maintaining a vigilant state (Tang et al., 2012), which is important
during threat. Less overlapwas evident in the ventral attentionnet-
work that is thought to interrupt top-down operations through
bottom-up “salience” detection (Corbetta et al., 2008), although
robust activity was observed in the mid cingulate regions shown
in Figure 5 that support the action monitoring that occurs, espe-
cially, in situations involving physical pain (Morecraft and Van
Hoesen, 1992; Vogt, 2005). Taken together, this pattern of results
suggests, strikingly, that immersion in the physical danger situa-
tions (from a ﬁrst-person perspective with eyes closed) engaged
attention networks that are studied almost exclusively using
nodes remaining the same). Because the network maps we present here are taken
fromYeo et al. (2011), we use their terminology. They note (and thus so do we) that
the ventral attention network, especially, is similar to what has been described as the
salience network (Seeley et al., 2007) and the cingulo-opercular network (Dosenbach
et al., 2007).
external visual cues. Consistent with the idea of situated emotional
experience, participants engaged in themonitoring of the environ-
ment and preparation for ﬂexible action that would be adaptive
in action to a physical threat when immersed in physical danger
situations.
Immersion ratings correlate with activity in different regions during
social evaluation vs. physical danger situations
To provide another test of our second hypothesis, we examined
whether self-reported immersion ratings of “being there” in the
situation (from the training session) were associated with brain
activity during the two situation types. If emotional experience is
situated, then feeling immersed in a situation should be realized by
neural circuitry that underlies engaging in the speciﬁc situation.
Whereas immersion in social evaluation situations should occur
when affect is grounded inmentalizing about others, immersion in
physical danger situations should occur when affect is grounded in
taking action in the environment. The results displayed in Figure 6
support this prediction.
During social evaluation situations, participants’ immersion
ratings correlatedwith activity in anteriormedial prefrontal cortex
(frontal pole area; peak voxel −6 51 0; 23 voxels) and in superior
temporal gyrus/sulcus (peak voxel −47 −49 14; 24 voxels; see
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FIGURE 5 | Comparison of the physical danger map from this study with the attention networks defined byYeo et al. (2011).
Figure 6). As described above, these regions are part of the default
modenetwork and are central to social perception andmentalizing
(Allison et al., 2000; Buckner et al., 2008; Adolphs, 2009;VanOver-
walle, 2009). The anterior, frontal pole region of medial prefrontal
cortex is considered the anterior hub of the default mode network
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) that integrates affective information
from the body with social event knowledge (including inferences
about others’ thoughts) originating in ventral and dorsal aspects
of medial prefrontal cortex, respectively (Mitchell et al., 2005;
Krueger et al., 2009). This integration may underlie the experi-
ence of “personal signiﬁcance” (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) that
appears important for immersing in social evaluation situations.
In contrast, during physical danger situations, participants’
immersion ratings correlated with activity in dorsal anterior
cingulate/mid cingulate (extending into SMA; peak −1 17 40;
40 voxels) and in left inferior parietal cortex (peak −36 −46
39; 15 voxels; see Figure 6). The robust cluster of activity
that emerged in the cingulate is part of the ventral atten-
tion “salience” network, and it is anterior to the mid cingulate
activity observed in the initial whole-brain contrasts reported
above. Because this region has been implicated across stud-
ies of emotion, pain, and cognitive control, and because it is
anatomically positioned at the intersection of insular-limbic and
fronto-parietal sub-networks within the attention system, it may
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FIGURE 6 | Regions in which neural activity was significantly correlated with participants’ “being there” ratings of immersion collected during the
training session just prior to scanning, for the social evaluation situations and for the physical danger situations.
play an especially important role in specifying goal-directed action
based on affective signals originating in the body (Shackman et al.,
2011; Touroutoglou et al., 2012). This integration may under-
lie the experience of action-oriented agency (Craig, 2009) that
appears important for immersing in physical danger situations.
The signiﬁcant correlation with activity in left inferior parietal
cortex, which supports planning action in egocentric space (e.g.,
Fogassi and Luppino, 2005), further suggests that immersion in
physical danger situations is driven by preparing to act in the
environment.
DISCUSSION
Our novel scenario immersion paradigm revealed robust patterns
of neural activity when participants immersed themselves in social
evaluation scenarios and in physical danger scenarios. Consistent
with participants’ high self-reported immersion ratings, neural
activity across multiple sensory regions, and across limbic regions
involved in the multisensory integration underlying the selec-
tion, encoding, and interpretation that inﬂuences what is salient
and remembered (e.g., amygdala, hippocampus), occurred during
both situation types. In addition to this shared activity, distributed
patterns unique to each situation type reﬂected situated respond-
ing, with regions involved in mentalizing and social cognition
more active during social evaluation and with regions involved
in attention and action planning more active during physical
danger.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that our method pro-
duced vivid, engaging experiences during neuroimaging scans
and that it could be used to study a variety of emotional expe-
riences. One reason this immersion paradigmmay be so powerful
is that people often ﬁnd themselves immersed in imagined situa-
tions in day-to-day life. Large-scale experience sampling studies
have revealed that people spend much of their time imagin-
ing experiences that are unrelated to the external world around
them (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). An important direc-
tion for future research will be to understand if, consistent
with other imagery-based paradigms, physiological changes occur
during our scenario immersion paradigm and if these physi-
ological changes are associated with subjective experiences of
immersion.
The scenarios we developed for this study represent a small
subset of the situations that people experience in real life (see also
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). Because emotional experiences
vary tremendously, it is adaptive to develop situated knowledge
that guides inference and responding when similar situations
arise in the future (Barsalou, 2003, 2008, 2009; Barrett, 2013).
Here, we focused on immersion in emotion-inducing situations
before they were explicitly categorized as an emotion (or another
state). From our perspective, the situation plays a critical role
in the emergence of an emotion, and it should not be con-
sidered a separate phenomenon from it (Barrett, 2009b, 2012;
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). For example, it would be impos-
sible to experience fear upon delivering a public speech without
inferring others’ thoughts. Instead of viewing mentalizing as a
“cold” cognitive process that interacts with a primitive “hot” emo-
tion, we view mentalizing as an essential part of the situation
in which the emotion emerges. Likewise, it would be impossi-
ble to experience fear upon getting lost in the woods without
focusing attention on the environment (in other words, if one
was instead lost in internal thought while traversing the same
environment, it is unlikely that this fear would occur). We pro-
pose that it will be more productive to study emotional experience
as dynamic situated conceptualizations that the brain continually
generates to interpret one’s current state (based on prior experi-
ence), as opposed to temporally constrained cognition-emotion
frameworks that often strip away much of the dynamically chang-
ing situated context. A situated approach also offers new insights
into studying dynamic emotion regulation and dysregulation
(Barrett et al., in press).
Network approaches to brain function provide functional
frameworks for interpreting the distributed patterns that char-
acterize situated experiences (Cabral et al., 2011; Deco et al., 2011;
Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). As shown
in Figures 4 and 5, the patterns unique to each situation type in
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this study can be differentiated by the anatomically constrained
resting state networks6 identiﬁed in previous work (Raichle et al.,
2001; Fox et al., 2005; Vincent et al., 2006; Dosenbach et al., 2007;
Fair et al., 2007; Seeley et al., 2007; Yeo et al., 2011; Tourouto-
glou et al., 2012). Whereas the neural patterns underlying social
threat situations primarily map onto the default mode network
that supports social inference and mentalizing, the neural pat-
terns underlying physical threat situations primarily map onto
attention networks underlying monitoring of the environment
and action planning. The neural pattern unique to each situ-
ation type reﬂects adaptive, situated responding. Furthermore,
regions traditionally associated with emotion diverged in line
with these networks (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex as part
of the default mode network; lateral orbitofrontal cortex and
cingulate regions as part of the attention networks). Interest-
ingly, these regions appear to be central to immersion in each
type of situation, with the anterior medial prefrontal cortex
(which is often considered part of ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex) associated with immersion during social evaluation situations
and dorsal anterior cingulate associated with immersion dur-
ing physical danger situations. These results suggest, strikingly,
that the brain realizes immersion differently depending on the
situation.
Resting state networks provide a starting point for examining
how networks underlie situated experiences, but recent evidence
suggests that coordination between regions in these networks
dynamically changes during different psychological states (e.g.,
van Marle et al., 2010; Raz et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). In
this study, for example, the neural patterns underlying physical
danger experiences recruited various aspects of several different
attention networks. Attention is primarily studied using simple
visual detection tasks that examine external stimuli vs. internal
goal dichotomies. Recent reviews emphasize the need for research
that examines how attention systems operate during experiences
guided by memory (e.g., Hutchinson and Turk-Browne, 2012),
which arguably constitute much of our experience. Because infe-
rior parietal cortex and cingulate regions ﬁgured prominently in
the pattern observed across the attention networks in this study,
this particular conﬁguration may reﬂect the attention operations
involved in coordinating bodily actions in space. It is also impor-
tant to consider that these patterns reﬂect relative differences
between the social and physical threat situations. As we showed
initially, the situation types also share patterns of activity that
contribute to the overall pattern of situated activity. In our view,
it is useful to think about situated neural activity as dynamically
changing patterns that are distributed across structurally and func-
tionally distinct networks (see also Barrett and Satpute, 2013).
Even within a structurally deﬁned network, different distributed
patterns of neural activity may reﬂect unique functional motifs
that underlie different experiences and behaviors (Sporns and
Kotter, 2004).
In closing, a psychological construction approach to studying
situated emotion motivates different questions than traditional
6The term“resting state” is oftenmisinterpreted to mean the resting brain. It should
not be assumed that the brain is actually “at rest” during these scans, but simply that
there is no externally orienting task.
approaches to studying emotion. It invites shifting research agen-
das from deﬁning ﬁve or so emotion categories to studying the
rich situations that characterize emotional experiences.
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